- Rebuttable (e.g. drafting mistake)

"[155] Whilst it is true that it is a general principle of statutory construction that the legislator should be assumed to have known the existing law at the time when it legislated, that presumption is rebuttable and, in those cases in which the Inco principle has been applied, it has repeatedly been rebutted.  In many of those cases, the error which has been identified and rectified using the Inco principle has stemmed from an apparent failure on the part of the legislator to understand the legal context in which the legislation in question had been enacted.  For example:

(1)           in Inco, the error which was rectified arose because, in making an amendment to the legislation in question, Parliament apparently failed to understand the interaction between that legislation and earlier legislation, with the result that the amendment had the effect of barring an appeal to the Court of Appeal from any decision under the relevant part of the earlier legislation and not simply carrying forward into the legislation in question the restrictions on appeal contained in that part;

(2)          in Bogdanic, the error which was rectified arose because, in making the commencement order, the Secretary of State apparently failed to understand that the carriers liability regime included penalties for evading immigration control in a prescribed immigration control zone as well as on UK territory itself; and

(3)          in Kelly, the error which was rectified arose because, in dealing with the transition from one regime which dealt with the release of prisoners to another such regime, Parliament  apparently failed to understand that each prisoner's right to be released unconditionally and to have his licence terminated once he had served three–quarters of his sentence remained in place despite the new regime's entering into force.

It follows that the assumption that Parliament would have known that EI 3 did not include cider when it chose to enact a definition of "alcoholic beverage" which cross–referred to EI 3 is rebuttable and, on the facts of this case, is rebutted." (JD Wetherspoon Plc v. HMRC [2025] UKFTT 658 (TC), Judge Beare)

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Judicial interpretations of the same wording

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See also A1. Interpretation (general) on Settled Interpretation 

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- Parliament presumed to intend well established meaning of concept used (e.g. capital expenditure)

"[52] First, when the capital expenditure exclusion was first introduced in 2004 (by section 38 of the Finance Act 2004, see para 18 above), the concept of expenditure of a capital nature was already well-established in the tax code. It had a long history and had been the subject of authoritative judicial interpretation in the case law. I shall return to some of that case law below. The principle established in Barras v Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co Ltd [1933] AC 402 and re-affirmed in R (N) v Lewisham London Borough Council [2014] UKSC 62, [2015] AC 1259 applies, and as Lord Hodge JSC explained at para 53:
"... where Parliament re-enacts a statutory provision which has been the subject of authoritative judicial interpretation, the court will readily infer that Parliament intended the re-enacted provision to bear the meaning that case law had already established ..."

[53] Parliament can be taken to have been aware of the established capital/revenue case law in 2004 and in these circumstances, it would be surprising if the exclusion for expenditure of a capital nature introduced by section 38 of the Finance Act 2004 was intended to have a special narrower meaning without anything to signal that this was so. While it is true that the code for taxation of trading companies is different to the regime that applies to companies with investment business, the words used, first in new section 75(3) and subsequently re-enacted in almost identical terms in section 1219(3)(a) simply do not admit of the construction proposed by COHL. Rather, it can readily be inferred that in using the phrase "expenses of a capital nature" the legislative intention was that this phrase should be interpreted in accordance with the meaning established by case law relating to the materially similar phrase used in other parts of the tax code." (Centrica Overseas Holdings Ltd v. HMRC [2024] UKSC 25, Lady Simler)

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- Apply previous case law if same wording is re-enacted

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"[64] Fourthly, the concept of "items of a capital nature" has a very long history in the case law going back for almost a century. I will return to that case law later. It can reasonably be presumed therefore that, in enacting a similar provision in 2004, the intention of Parliament was to adopt the meaning which had been given to that concept in the case law.
[65] In R (N) v Lewisham London Borough Council [2014] UKSC 62; [2015] AC 1259, the Supreme Court re-affirmed the well known principle in Barras v Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co Ltd [1933] AC 402. At para. 53, Lord Hodge JSC said that:
"… where Parliament re-enacts a statutory provision which has been the subject of authoritative judicial interpretation, the court will readily infer that Parliament intended the re-enacted provision to bear the meaning that case law had already established …"
[66] In my view, what Parliament did in 2004 is analogous. This indicates that Parliament intended that the phrase "expenses of a capital nature" should be interpreted in accordance with the meaning which it had acquired in the case law on what is materially the same phrase in other parts of the tax code." (HMRC v. Centrica Overseas Holdings Limited [2022] EWCA Civ 1520, Singh, Newey, Henderson LJJJ)

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"[26] There is another principle of statutory interpretation (usually referred to as the Barras principle). This principle is that where words in an Act of Parliament have been given a clear and authoritative judicial interpretation, and Parliament uses the same words in a subsequent Act in a similar context, those words will be taken to have been used in the same way as the courts had previously interpreted them: Barras v Aberdeen Steam Trawling and Fishing Co Ltd [1933] AC 402. But since we are concerned with guidance given by HMRC rather than with court rulings, that principle is not in play." (Hyman v. HMRC [2022] EWCA Civ 185, Lewison, Simler, Snowden LJJJ)

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