© 2025 by Michael Firth KC, Gray's Inn Tax Chambers
Contact: michael.firth@taxbar.com
A7. Drafting mistakes
THE PRINCIPLE ​​
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Correcting plain drafting mistakes
"[21] The only principle of statutory interpretation which might enable the plain meaning of legislation to be circumvented is that it can be given a strained interpretation where that is necessary to avoid absurd or perverse consequences: see, for example, Inland Revenue Comrs v Hinchy [1960] AC 748, 768 (Lord Reid), and R (Edison First Power Ltd) v Central Valuation Officer [2003] 4 All ER 209, paras 25 (Lord Hoffmann) and 116 (Lord Millett). Indeed, even greater violence can be done to statutory language where it is plain that there has been a drafting mistake: R v Federal Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1974] 1 WLR 505, 509 (Lord Reid), and Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586, 592 (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead).” (Shahid v Scottish Ministers [2015] UKSC 58)
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“It has long been established that the role of the courts in construing legislation is not confined to resolving ambiguities in statutory language. The court must be able to correct obvious drafting errors. In suitable cases, in discharging its interpretative function the court will add words, or omit words or substitute words. …This power is confined to plain cases of drafting mistakes. The courts are ever mindful that their constitutional role in this field is interpretative. They must abstain from any course which might have the appearance of judicial legislation. A statute is expressed in language approved and enacted by the legislature. So the courts exercise considerable caution before adding or omitting or substituting words. Before interpreting a statute in this way the court must be abundantly sure of three matters: (1) the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question; (2) that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question; and (3) the substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed. The third of these conditions is of crucial importance. Otherwise any attempt to determine the meaning of the enactment would cross the boundary between construction and legislation." (Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586 at 592, Lord Nicholls).
“Therefore, before a correction can be made it is necessary to be “abundantly sure” of the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question; that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question; and the substance of the provision Parliament would have made.” (Reeves v. HMRC [2017] UKFTT 192 (TC), §32, Judge Brooks).
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- Distinguished from strained interpretation
"[69] The first is that, before applying the Inco principle - which raises different issues and to which we turn when we consider Issue Two - when adopting a strained construction of a provision, there is only a certain amount of violence that can be done to the language which was actually used in the provision no matter what the purpose of the legislator may have been and no matter how absurd or anomalous the literal meaning of the language in the provision may be - see Lord Reid in Hinchy at 767. In this case:
(1) the definition of "alcoholic beverage" used the word "means" and not "includes". It was therefore exhaustive and not inclusive; and
(2) the definition referred to an existing definition elsewhere in the legislation which was of long standing. (EI 3 was enacted in 1994 and the language used in EI 3 dates back to the origins of the VAT legislation in the Finance Act 1972 (the "FA 1972"). That language has therefore been in the legislation for over fifty years.) Although HMT and the Respondents were under the mistaken apprehension that EI 3 included cider, it quite clearly did not (and the Respondents now accept that it did not). More particularly, the House of Commons should be presumed to have known that EI 3 did not as it is presumed to know the existing law at the time it legislates - see Campbell at paragraph [44] and Lachaux at paragraph [13].
[70] Consequently, we do not see how, even applying a strained construction of the language used in the definition of "alcoholic beverage", cider can be said to have been included in the definition." (JD Wetherspoon Plc v. HMRC [2025] UKFTT 658 (TC), Judge Beare
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- An aspect of purposive interpretation
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"[142] We do not think that the question of whether the principle in Inco Europe applies can be disassociated from the question of purposive construction. This is not just because both are principles of statutory interpretation. Rather, the underlying difficulty is what appears to have been an assumption by HMRC, possibly shared by the draftsperson of Schedule 1 to FA 2012, that s 29(1)(a) TMA was broad enough to catch “self-standing” income tax charges which are not charges on amounts of income. If, as we have held, that assumption was wrong on a purposive construction of the legislation, then it is very difficult to see how any error made by the draftsperson of Schedule 1 FA 2012 was the sort of slip that Lord Nicholls had in mind. This was not simply a case of Homer, in the shape of the draftsperson, having nodded (Inco Europe at p.589). Homer would have been under a material misapprehension." (HMRC v. Wilkes [2021] UKUT 150 (TCC), Falk J and Judge Herrington)
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MEANING OF DRAFTING MISTAKE ​​
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Drafting mistake v. drafting accurately reflecting mistaken prior belief​​
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- Must be satisfied there is a mistake in the drafting
"[89] In our view Parliament chose to include only the words 'member of the group' deliberately because it was intending only to cover transfers within groups. There is no mistake in the drafting in our view. We agree with HMRC that the concept of economic ownership is not referred to in the statutory provision or in the extra statutory materials.
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[92] The words used in para 15A have a readily understandable ordinary and natural meaning and accord with the intended purpose. There is no basis upon which to conclude that there is any drafting error in the provision to allow us to deviate from the meaning or to read in words." (M Group Holdings Limited v. HMRC [2023] UKUT 213 (TCC), Green J and Judge Ramshaw)
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- No mistake in drafting if draftsperson never formed any intention on the matter
"[46]...In the first place, it is possible that neither the draftsperson nor Parliament formed any intention on the point. In previous cases in which legislation has been “rectified”, it could be said that the draftsperson/Parliament had intended to achieve a particular result but failed to do so or, alternatively, that the legislation at issue was liable to contradict something that the draftsperson/Parliament had intended. In the present case, in contrast, it is quite conceivable that the draftsperson and Parliament simply did not address their minds to whether section 29 of TMA 1970 should apply where there has been no self-assessment return. It is to be noted in that context that (a) while FA 2012 provided for an amendment to be made to section 7 of TMA 1970, it said nothing at all about section 29 and (b) there is no suggestion that any indication of an intention that HMRC should be able to make a discovery assessment in circumstances such as those in this case is to be found in the explanatory notes relating to FA 2012 or in any policy or other document prepared in connection with the Bill that became FA 2012." (HMRC v. Wilkes [2022] EWCA Civ 1612, Newey, Baker, Arnold LJJ)
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- Cannot use strained interpretation to adopt meaning it is clear was not intended due to mistaken belief
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"[72] There is a second, more–nuanced, reason why, before applying the Inco principle, the definition of "alcoholic beverage" cannot be construed as including cider even on a strained construction and that is as follows.
[73] Since it is now common ground that, at the time when the RR Order was enacted, EI 3 did not include cider, the only way that the definition of "alcoholic beverage" in Group 14 can be construed purposively so as to include cider would be to read into the definition a specific reference to cider in addition to the reference in the definition to the other alcoholic beverages falling within EI 3. However, we know from the admissible secondary material that it simply cannot have been the intention of the House of Commons - or, for that matter, HMT - to include such a reference because, at the time when the RR Order was enacted, everyone, including HMT, the Respondents and the Appellant, was under the misapprehension that cider fell within EI 3. It therefore cannot have been the purpose of the legislator to include in the definition a specific reference to cider because it was (mistakenly) thought that cider already fell within the definition as a result of the express reference in the definition to EI 3. It is precisely for that reason that the Respondents are now seeking to apply the Inco principle to the definition in the context of Issue Two." (JD Wetherspoon Plc v. HMRC [2025] UKFTT 658 (TC), Judge Beare)
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- Not applicable where draftsman was under a material misapprehension as to the law
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"[142] We do not think that the question of whether the principle in Inco Europe applies can be disassociated from the question of purposive construction. This is not just because both are principles of statutory interpretation. Rather, the underlying difficulty is what appears to have been an assumption by HMRC, possibly shared by the draftsperson of Schedule 1 to FA 2012, that s 29(1)(a) TMA was broad enough to catch “self-standing” income tax charges which are not charges on amounts of income. If, as we have held, that assumption was wrong on a purposive construction of the legislation, then it is very difficult to see how any error made by the draftsperson of Schedule 1 FA 2012 was the sort of slip that Lord Nicholls had in mind. This was not simply a case of Homer, in the shape of the draftsperson, having nodded (Inco Europe at p.589). Homer would have been under a material misapprehension." (HMRC v. Wilkes [2021] UKUT 150 (TCC), Falk J and Judge Herrington)
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- Draftsperson misunderstood the way existing legislation worked, rendering amendment ineffective
"[79] The other issue of interpretation concerns the fact, accepted by both parties and identified by the FTT, that on a literal reading of s882(5B) it has no effect. The provision is stated to apply "where, for section 1259 purposes, references in this section to a company are read as references to the firm". The problem with this form of words is that s1259 does not make any provision that references to a company are to be read as references to a firm. The condition thus has nothing to bite on because of a misunderstanding of the way s1259 operates.
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[87] Accordingly, standing back Parliament's purpose was to:
(1) amend the concept of "related party"; and
(2) include firms in the analysis of "related party" in situations where s1259 was relevant (i.e. where the profits from which a corporate member's share in a partnership are being calculated).
[88] In our view the simple problem is that, when describing the function of s1259, the drafter has misdescribed it and thereby failed to give effect to the intention. As to the second Inco Europe principle, the lack of effect ensuing from that misdescription is plainly inadvertent. The drafting fails to give effect to the purpose of applying a participation condition when the issue of the related party exception applied and fails to ensure that a party was not excluded from falling within the remit of the related party exception because it was a firm rather than a company.
[89] In respect of the third Inco Europe condition we can accordingly be satisfied as to the provision Parliament would have made. We agree with Mr Tidmarsh, the clear gist of the provision is that, where s1259 applies, the provision is to be taken as requiring references in s882 to a company as if they were references to a firm.
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[92] While Mr Trevett's submissions emphasised that the facts of this case were a long way from those in Inco Europe (where a consequential provision had inadvertently removed a statutory jurisdiction), it is the principles from that case which are relevant. But, in any case we do not see that the misdescription of a statutory provision in circumstances where the surrounding context makes clear what was intended is such a long way from the drafting defect in Inco Europe. Moreover the facts of Pollen well illustrate the way in which the Inco Europe principles might have wider application beyond the particular sort of error with which that case was concerned." (Muller UK and Ireland Group LLP v. HMRC [2024] UKUT 273 (TCC), Trower J and Judge Raghavan)
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- Assuming Parliament made a mistake about the law is an interpretation of last resort
"[65] That suggestion might have force if ascertaining the intention of Parliament involved a sociological inquiry into what was actually in the minds of individual legislators. However, that would be to mistake the nature of the interpreter's task. When courts identify the intention of Parliament, they do so assuming Parliament to be a rational and informed body pursuing the identifiable purposes of the legislation it enacts in a coherent and principled manner. That assumption shows appropriate respect for Parliament, enables Parliament most effectively to achieve its purposes and promotes the integrity of the law. In essence, the courts interpret the language of a statute or statutory instrument as having the meaning which best explains why a rational and informed legislature would have acted as Parliament has. Attributing to Parliament an error or oversight is therefore an interpretation to be adopted only as a last resort." (R (oao ZYN) v. Walsall Metropolitan BC [2014] EWHC 1918 (Admin))
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Mistaken failure to legislate​​
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- FTT not correcting HMRC's failure to give themselves power to raise assessment to recover incorrectly claimed credit
"[95] We are not prepared to similarly infer for accounting periods in which the Appellant did not submit a correction. When enacting FA 17 Parliament consciously placed the care and management of SDIL with HMRC; in doing so Parliament can be assumed to have taken account of the provisions of sections 5 and 9 CRCA and sections 11 and 12 IA. We are also entitled to presume that Parliament understood that the care and management provision imposes a duty on HMRC to collect the right amount of tax. Presumably for this reason, Parliament did not authorise the enactment of regulations concerning such matters as verification of returns, rather, it assumed such a general power to do so and provided for HMRC to assess where the outcome of verification revealed that the correct amount of tax had not been collected. In contrast Parliament legislated expressly for regulations to provide for the withdrawal of credits and for the correction of errors. Whilst not a complete framework we consider the provisions referred to above facilitate a conclusion that section 9 CRCA provides for an ancillary power to process a correction including a request from a liable person to reduce the value of credits previously claimed.
[96] However, for reasons unknown and unexplained HMRC did not similarly seek a regulation wich provided them any express powers to deny/reject/withdraw credits to which it is possible to apply section 9 CRCA and provide ancillary powers. In our view the only statutory power (express or implied) capable, if at all, of compelling the withdrawal of an incorrectly claimed credit is the power to assess.
[97] We consider this conclusion to be consistent with that reached in a very different context by the High Court in Oliver Fisher (a firm) v Legal Services Commission [2002] EWH 1017 (Admin) although we did not derive any particular direct assistance from that judgment itself in reaching our conclusion.
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[102] The credits for periods in which no SDIL was declared have not been similarly withdrawn by way of the Assessments and we have concluded that through a failure to draft and have enacted a specific power to withdraw/assess for periods where there was no amount of SDIL due in the period HMRC have no means of removing the credit balance because for those returns there is no SDIL which becomes due when the credit is withdrawn. However, without a free standing power to withdraw it is our view that the credits claimed in periods in which there was no SDIL due remain on the Appellant's account capable of being set against amounts of SDIL falling due in later periods. The effect of our conclusion is set out in the table below:..." (Millenium Cash & Carry Ltd v. HMRC [2025] UKFTT 865 (TC), Judge Brown KC)
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IDENTIFYING DRAFTING MISTAKES​​
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- No rational explanation for omission of an item
"[67] In relation to the point made in paragraph 66(2)(b) above, we agree with Mr Elliott that excluding cider from the definition would be anomalous and absurd for the reasons summarised in paragraph 59(6) above. In the words of Laws LJ in R (Kelly) v The Secretary of State for Justice [2008] EWCA Civ 177 ("Kelly") at paragraph [18], "there is no rational explanation for the omission". We are not persuaded that the differences which were put to us on behalf of the Appellant between cider and other alcoholic beverages mean that the exclusion of cider from the definition is perfectly rational and is not an absurdity or anomaly. We would add that we are encouraged in that belief by the fact that the Appellant, the RPG and the chief executive of CAMRA, amongst others, believed, at the time when the reduced rate was operating, that cider fell within the definition. In other words, their understanding reflected the fact that it would be absurd and anomalous were that not to be the case.
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[153] We would add that, in Pollen, the language in the provision in question certainly "worked" without amending the legislation. It was just that, in the opinion of the Court of Appeal, it "worked" to produce an anomalous and absurd result so that the Inco principle was applied - see Pollen at paragraphs [45] to [49]. In this case, the definition of "alcoholic beverage" "works" to the same extent. The distinction which it creates between cider and other alcoholic beverages is perfectly clear from the drafting but there is no intelligible or rational basis for that distinction."​ (JD Wetherspoon Plc v. HMRC [2025] UKFTT 658 (TC), Judge Beare​
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- Accidental omission of one devolved legislature from list
"[52] However, I have reached the view that this is one of those very rare occasions where it is permissible, and indeed required of me, to read words into legislation to correct an obvious drafting error.
[53] The insertion is not too big, it simply completes a list of institutions reflecting devolution arrangements as they now prevail in the UK.
[54] Further, the subject matter is not penal, it is concerned with the appropriate charging of VAT in a consistent and comprehensive manner across the nations of the UK." (Cascade Care Limited v. HMRC [2025] UKFTT 1332 (TC), Judge Blackwell)
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- Nonsensical gap in the period looked at by an anti-avoidance provision corrected
"[60] In short, the FTT and UT were correct to conclude that the proviso does not contain a loophole that permits transactions earlier on the same day of the distribution to escape its application, a result which would be absurd.
[61] The difficulty with the drafting is that the term "effective date" is defined in s.119 FA 2003 as a particular date, generally the date of completion. It is a concept used throughout the legislation – Ms Shaw told us that it was used almost 200 times – with no indication of any scope to treat it as referring to a particular time on a day. Accordingly, read literally, s.54(4)(b) appears to refer to a three year period ending on the day immediately before completion, in this case 4 July rather than 5 July 2011. But that would leave a nonsensical gap between midnight on that date and the completion of the relevant transaction on the following day.
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[70] Similarly, in this case Parliament cannot have intended the operation of the proviso to be avoided by the simple expedient of ensuring that the transaction qualifying for group relief was entered into after, rather than before, midnight on the effective date." (The Tower One St George Wharf Limited v. HMRC [2025] EWCA Civ 1588, Falk LJ)
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- Where intention was to broadly replicate previous law, need to test overall effect of potential mistaken reference
"[27] The consultation document provides support for Mr Afzal's submission that the purpose of section 685 was broadly to replicate and simplify sections 689 and 690 of ITA 2007 as originally enacted. The earlier and subsequent versions of section 685 provide support for Mr Afzal's submission that, if the reference to subsection (2) in subsection (6) is an error, had the error in the Bill been noticed then Parliament could have easily corrected this by changing the reference in subsection (6) to subsection (4).
[28] However, the above is not enough to satisfy the second requirement set out in Inco because it does not establish that "by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to" its purpose of broadly replicating and simplifying the predecessor provisions.
[29] In order to address this aspect of the test our starting point is to interpret section 685(6) as it is drafted in the context of subsections (2) and (4) and the relevant case law and then apply that to the facts of this case to establish whether subsection (6) as drafted, fails to broadly replicate and simplify the earlier provisions.
[30] Our first task is therefore to understand how this aspect of the TIS legislation operated previously and then compare that to how it operates under the TIS legislation that we are concerned with in this appeal.
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[69] When interpreting the words of subsection (6) purposively and in their context, we find that subsection (6) is clear on its face and the outcome of this appeal is the same irrespective of whether subsection (6) refers to subsection (4) or subsection (2). It follows that we cannot, as required by Inco, be "abundantly sure... that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to" the stated purpose of broadly replicating and simplifying the earlier provisions. On that basis we find that subsection (6) does not contain an obvious drafting error capable of correction by this Tribunal. " (Hunt v. HMRC [2025] UKFTT 538 (TC), Judge Snelders)
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- Inadvertent error in re-write of legislation
"[141] With the benefit of hindsight, it is not difficult to see what went wrong when the draughtsman of section 23 and List C in CAA 2001 attempted to merge column 2 of Table 1 and column 2 of Table 2 (together with certain other provisions) "into a single list of items that are unaffected by the express exclusions in Sections 21 and 22" (to quote from the explanatory note on Change 2, set out at [134] above). Inadvertently, the draughtsman reproduced the substance of the items listed in column 2 of Table 1, but not the wording of paragraphs 1(3) and 2(3)(b) which made it clear that the saving extended to expenditure on the provision of those items, as well to expenditure on them.
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[143] If my analysis is correct thus far, the next question is whether it is possible to construe section 23 and List C in a way which gives effect to Parliament's evident intention, as elucidated by recourse to the 1994 precursor legislation. I consider that there are at least two ways in which the language of section 23 and List C may legitimately be so construed.
[144] The first, and in my view preferable, solution is to construe the words "on any item" in section 23(3) as equivalent in meaning, in this particular context, to "on the provision of any item". In a suitable context, I see no reason why expenditure "on" an item should not include expenditure on its provision, or (alternatively) why it should not be regarded as shorthand for the composite phrase "on the provision of" which lies at the heart of the judge-made law on capital allowances reflected in section 11(4) of CAA 2001. That this is a perfectly possible, and to my mind natural, use of language is in my view borne out by the heading to column 2 of Table 1 in Schedule 1AA to CAA 1990: see [138] above. I would add that these column headings appear to me to be an integral part of the Tables as drafted, and not comparable with side notes which are merely added for ease of reference and receive no Parliamentary scrutiny; but even if that is wrong, the column headings still form part of FA 1994 as enacted.
[145] The second, and more radical, solution is to exercise the power, which the court undoubtedly has, to correct clear cases of drafting mistakes as a matter of statutory construction. As Lord Nicholls explained in Inco Europe Ltd v First Choice Distribution [2000] 1 WLR 586, at 592:
"This power is confined to plain cases of drafting mistakes. The courts are ever mindful that their constitutional role in this field is interpretative. They must abstain from any course which might have the appearance of judicial legislation. A statute is expressed in language approved and enacted by the legislature. So, the courts exercise considerable caution before adding or omitting or substituting words. Before interpreting a statute in this way, the court must be abundantly sure of three matters:
(1) the intended purposes of the statute or provision in question;
(2) that by inadvertence the draughtsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question; and
(3) the substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed.
The third of these conditions is of crucial importance. Otherwise, any attempt to determine the meaning of the enactment would cross the boundary between construction and legislation: see per Lord Diplock in G Jones v Wrotham Park Settled Estates [1980] AC 74,105-106."
[146] For an example of the application of this principle to a tax statute, see the decision of this court in Pollen Estate Trustee Company Ltd v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2013] EWCA Civ 753, [2013] 3 All E R 742. The leading judgment in that case was delivered by Lewison LJ, with whom McFarlane and Laws LJ agreed. At [26], Lewison LJ also quoted the well-known words of Lord Reid in Luke v IRC [1963] AC 557 at 577:
"To apply the words literally is to defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and to produce a wholly unreasonable result. To achieve the obvious intention and produce a reasonable result we must do some violence to the words. This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges. The general principle is well settled. It is only where the words are absolutely incapable of a construction which will accord with the apparent intention of the provision and will avoid a wholly unreasonable result, that the words of the enactment must prevail".
[147] In the present case, if one needs to go that far, I consider that the three conditions stated by Lord Nicholls in Inco Europe are clearly satisfied. First, the evident purpose of List C was to preserve allowances on expenditure which would have qualified for relief both before and after the enactment of FA 1994. Secondly, a drafting error has obviously been made in transposing the items from the second columns of Tables 1 and 2 in Schedule AA1 to CAA 1990. Thirdly, it is clear what Parliament was seeking to achieve in substance, and it is easy to supply wording which would have corrected the error. This could be done either by inserting the words "the provision of" between "on" and "any item" in section 23(3) of CAA 2001, or, more laboriously, by inserting the words "The provision of" before each of Items 1 to 21 in List C." (Urenco Chemplants Limited v. HMRC [2022] EWCA Civ 1587, Henderson, Thirlwall, Arnold LJJJ)
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- More readily found in delegated legislation
"[57] Whilst I accept delegated legislation which has had limited parliamentary scrutiny is more readily amenable to correction for drafting error, I do not consider such considerations carry any weight in this case. This is because the error was not in the 2002 Order. When the 2002 Order was made the GWA 2006 had not been enacted. Accordingly, the National Assembly for Wales had no powers to pass primary legislation – it could only pass subordinate legislation in place of the Secretary of State. There was therefore no drafting error in omitting the National Assembly for Wales at that time – any subordinate legislation it passed would be pursuant to a UK Act of Parliament and so covered by the definition of "state regulated"." (Cascade Care Limited v. HMRC [2025] UKFTT 1332 (TC), Judge Blackwell)
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CORRECTING THE MISTAKE​​
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- Sufficient to be confident of the substance of the correction
“We are not Parliamentary draftsmen; and it is sufficient that we can be confident of the gist or substance of the alteration, rather than its precise language.” (Pollen Estate Trustees v HMRC [2013] EWCA Civ 753, §49, Lewison LJ).
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- Uncertainty as to what remedy Parliament would have adopted to allow HMRC to charge HICBC
"[49] A second objection to FA 2012 being “rectified” is, in my view, that it is not possible to be “abundantly sure” what Parliament would have done had it perceived there to be an error. It might have included in FA 2012 provision for section 29(1) of TMA to be amended along the lines proposed by Mr Yates. It is by no means inconceivable, however, that it could have adopted a different course. It could, for example, have deemed child benefit to be “income” for the purposes of section 29 (compare section 7 of the Finance (No. 2) Act 2005), imposed a stand-alone assessment regime (compare paragraph 9 of schedule 16 to the Finance Act 2020), empowered HMRC to make regulations (compare section 255 of FA 2004) or introduced a power to make “simple” assessments such as subsequently arrived with FA 2016. It is noteworthy that FA 2022 does not amend section 29(1) in quite the way that Mr Yates propounded, but, rather, rewrites section 29(1)(a). In the circumstances, it appears to me that we cannot be “abundantly sure” of even the “gist or substance” of what would have been enacted.
[50] In short, it seems to me that, were we to “rectify” section 29 of TMA 1970 as HMRC propose, we would be engaging in judicial legislation, not discharging our interpretative function. It may well be that, had Parliament considered the matter, it would have chosen to amend section 29 so as enable HMRC to make an assessment in respect of HICBC where no return had been delivered. However, we cannot be “abundantly sure” that that was Parliament’s intention, nor as to the substance of what Parliament would have enacted. I therefore consider that this ground of appeal fails." (HMRC v. Wilkes [2022] EWCA Civ 1612, Newey, Baker, Arnold LJJ)
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