General exclusionary rule for statements in Parliament

"Under present law, there is a general rule that references to Parliamentary material as an aid to statutory construction is not permissible (“the exclusionary rule”): Davis v. Johnson [1979] AC 264 and Hadmor Productions Ltd v. Hamilton [1983] 1 A.C. 191. This rule did not always apply but was judge made. Thus, in Ash v. Abdy (1678) 3 Swans. 664 Lord Nottingham took judicial notice of his own experience when introducing the Bill in the House of Lords. The exclusionary rule was probably first stated by Willes J. in Millar v. Taylor (1769) 4 Burr. 2303, 2332. However, the case of In re Mew and Thorne (1862) 31 L.J.Bank. 87 shows that even in the middle of the last century the rule was not absolute: in that case Lord Westbury L.C. in construing an Act had regard to its Parliamentary history and drew an inference as to Parliament's intention in passing the legislation from the making of an amendment striking out certain words.

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Thus the reasons put forward for the present rule are first, that it preserves the constitutional proprieties leaving Parliament to legislate in words and the courts (not Parliamentary speakers), to construe the meaning of the words finally enacted; second, the practical difficulty of the expense of researching Parliamentary material which would arise if the material could be looked at; third, the need for the citizen to have access to a known defined text which regulates his legal rights; fourth, the improbability of finding helpful guidance from Hansard." (Pepper v. Hart [1993] AC 593, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson)

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- No distinction between relying on Hansard for mischief/purpose v. specific meaning (exclusionary rule applies to both)

"[42]...In Pepper v Hart the argument for use of Hansard material was directed to identifying both the purpose of the legislation and the specific meaning to be given to individual words and phrases (see [1993] AC 593, 600C) and in his leading speech in the case Lord Browne-Wilkinson made it clear that the guidance given in relation to relaxation of the rule forbidding any reference to Hansard was intended to cover both matters: [1993] AC 593, 634D ("references in court to Parliamentary material should only be permitted where such material clearly discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind the ambiguous or obscure words"). As Lord Browne-Wilkinson pointed out at p 635B-E the distinction between the two types of case (use of material to identify the mischief aimed at by, ie the purpose of, the legislation and the specific intention of Parliament in using the words set out in the legislation) "is highly artificial ... Given the purposive approach to construction now adopted by the courts in order to give effect to the true intentions of the legislature, the fine distinctions between looking for the mischief and looking for the intention in using words to provide the remedy are technical and inappropriate". On a purposive approach to interpretation of a statute, identification of the purpose or mischief is capable of directly affecting the meaning given to the words used by Parliament. Therefore, in both cases, the point of making reference to Hansard is to contend that it affects the proper interpretation of the statute, and there are no good grounds to distinguish between them as regards the relevance of the guidance given in Pepper v Hart." (Darwall v. Dartmoor National Park Authority [2025] UKSC 20)

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"[39] We are satisfied, in light of the guidance now provided by the Supreme Court in Darwall, that there is no basis on which Parliamentary statements are admissible save through the PvH gateway. On that basis, it would be astonishing if there were a more relaxed gateway for the admission of non-parliamentary, departmental or private material. As clearly articulated in Spath Holme, Bogdanic, and Agriculture Wales it is only right that the meaning of statutory instruments can be discerned from publicly available material." (Isle of Wight NHS Trust v. HMRC [2025] UKFTT 114 (TC), Judge Brown KC)​

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Limited exception if 3 conditions are met

"[32] In their written case the appellants sought to support their contention that a child’s acquisition of substantial ties with the UK by spending time in the UK in the first ten years of his or her life created a complete entitlement to citizenship by referring to statements by a Government minister, Timothy Raison, to the Standing Committee which considered an amendment which became section 1(4) to the 1981 Act. Such references are not a legitimate aid to statutory interpretation unless the three conditions set out by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593, 640 are met. The three conditions are (i) that the legislative provision must be ambiguous, obscure or, on a conventional interpretation, lead to absurdity; (ii) that the material must be or include one or more statements by a minister or other promoter of the Bill; and (iii) the statement must be clear and unequivocal on the point of interpretation which the court is considering. It was not argued, and I am not satisfied, that the first and third conditions are met in this case. The court was not referred to any relevant provision of primary legislation that was said to be ambiguous and the statements in any event did not meet the stringent requirements of the third condition. Sir James Eadie in para 10 of the Secretary of State’s written case referred to a ministerial statement in the House of Lords during the passage of the 2014 Act which sought to explain the policy behind what became section 68 of that Act. But it is not argued that this reference is admissible because the first condition in Pepper v Hart has been met. I am satisfied that there is no such ambiguity, obscurity or absurd result in the relevant statutory provisions which would allow the court to have regard to that statement." (R (oao O) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3, Lord Hodge)

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"My Lords, I have come to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, there are sound reasons for making a limited modification to the existing rule (subject to strict safeguards) unless there are constitutional or practical reasons which outweigh them. In my judgment, subject to the questions of the privileges of the House of Commons, reference to Parliamentary material should be permitted as an aid to the construction of legislation which is ambiguous or obscure or the literal meaning of which leads to an absurdity. Even in such cases references in court to Parliamentary material should only be permitted where such material clearly discloses the mischief aimed at or the legislative intention lying behind the ambiguous or obscure words. In the case of statements made in Parliament, as at present advised I cannot foresee that any statement other than the statement of the Minister or other promoter of the Bill is likely to meet these criteria." (Pepper v. Hart [1993] AC 593, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson)

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- Justification: Parliament may have been told what ambiguous words meant and accepted that

"I accept Mr. Lester's submissions, but my main reason for reaching this conclusion is based on principle. Statute law consists of the words that Parliament has enacted. It is for the courts to construe those words and it is the court's duty in so doing to give effect to the intention of Parliament in using those words. It is an inescapable fact that, despite all the care taken in passing legislation, some statutory provisions when applied to the circumstances under consideration in any specific case are found to be ambiguous. One of the reasons for such ambiguity is that the members of the legislature in enacting the statutory provision may have been told what result those words are intended to achieve. Faced with a given set of words which are capable of conveying that meaning it is not surprising if the words are accepted as having that meaning. Parliament never intends to enact an ambiguity. Contrast with that the position of the courts. The courts are faced simply with a set of words which are in fact capable of bearing two meanings. The courts are ignorant of the underlying Parliamentary purpose. Unless something in other parts of the legislation discloses such purpose, the courts are forced to adopt one of the two possible meanings using highly technical rules of construction. In many, I suspect most, cases references to Parliamentary materials will not throw any light on the matter. But in a few cases it may emerge that the very question was considered by Parliament in passing the legislation. Why in such a case should the courts blind themselves to a clear indication of what Parliament intended in using those words? The court cannot attach a meaning to words which they cannot bear, but if the words are capable of bearing more than one meaning why should not Parliament's true intention be enforced rather than thwarted?" (Pepper v. Hart [1993] AC 593, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson)

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- Justification: similar to looking at white papers and official reports

"A number of other factors support this view. As I have said, the courts can now look at white papers and official reports for the purpose of finding the “mischief” sought to be corrected, although not at draft clauses or proposals for the remedying of such mischief. A ministerial statement made in Parliament is an equally authoritative source of such information: why should the courts be cut off from this source of information as to the mischief aimed at? In any event, the distinction between looking at reports to identify the mischief aimed at but not to find the intention of Parliament in enacting the legislation is highly artificial." (Pepper v. Hart [1993] AC 593, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson)

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(1) Legislation is ambiguous, obscure or, on a conventional interpretation, leads to absurdity

"[32] ... I am satisfied that there is no such ambiguity, obscurity or absurd result in the relevant statutory provisions which would allow the court to have regard to that statement." (R (oao O) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 3, Lord Hodge)

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