© 2025 by Michael Firth KC, Gray's Inn Tax Chambers
Contact: michael.firth@taxbar.com
A9. Definitions in legislation
ORDINARY MEANING
Ordinary meaning of the term being defined is relevant
"[48] In an appropriate case “the potency of the term defined” may provide some guidance as to the meaning for that term as set out in a statutory definition. As it is put in Bennion, Bailey and Norbury, op. cit., section 18.6: “In the case of a statutory definition the defined term may itself colour the meaning of the definition”. Lord Hoffmann explained in MacDonald v Dextra Accessories Ltd [2005] 4 All ER 107, para 18, “a definition may give the words a meaning different from their ordinary meaning. But that does not mean that the choice of words adopted by Parliament must be wholly ignored. If the terms of the definition are ambiguous, the choice of the term to be defined may throw some light on what they mean”. I agree with Henderson LJ, paras 92-93 (citing Birmingham City Council v Walker [2007] 2 AC 262, para 11, per Lord Hoffmann, and Oxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council [2006] 2 AC 674, para 38, per Lord Hoffmann, and para 82, per Lord Scott of Foscote), that this principle is not confined to cases where there is an ambiguity in the terms of the definition, but means that when the definition is read as a whole the ordinary meaning of the word or phrase being defined forms part of the material which might potentially be used to throw light on the meaning of the definition. Whether and to what extent it does so depends on the circumstances and in particular on the terms of the legislation and the nature of the concept referred to by the word or phrase being defined." (R (oao PACCAR Inc) v. CAT [2023] UKSC 28, Lord Sales)
"[125] HMRC go on to submit that the mere fact that the overall profits may cap the remuneration does not convert a mechanism which is broadly typical of an employee's salary plus bonus into one that is typical of a sharing of profits between partners. Even an employee's salary is ultimately dependent on the ability of the employer to pay it. In using the term "disguised salary" Parliament was intending to capture methods of remunerating LLP members which are akin to salary in an employment context, and the use of the word "salary" may legitimately colour the meaning of the term defined: see R (PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal [2023] UKSC 28, [2023] 1 WLR 2594, at [48] and (in a tax context) MacDonald v Dextra Accessories Ltd [2005] UKHL 47, [2005] 4 All ER 107, at [18] per Lord Hoffmann." (HMRC v. Bluecrest Capital management (UK) LLP [2025] EWCA Civ 23, Henderson, Lewison, Arnold LJJ)
"[68] As the Court of Appeal observed in NCL CA, a literal reading of section 1291(1) would be capable of including the grant of an employee share option, but such a reading would ignore the context created by section 1290: NCL CA at [77]. As the Court of Appeal said at [77]-[78]:
...The FTT was right to note that "employee benefit contributions" is not itself directly defined. Even if it were, the choice of words used for a defined term is not to be treated as wholly neutral but may properly influence its meaning: see Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 AC 1101 per Lord Hoffmann at [17]. "Employee benefit contributions" is not an empty vessel or algebraic symbol, dependent wholly on section 1291(1) for any meaning.
78. A contribution, resulting in property being held or used under an employee benefit scheme, suggests a payment or transfer from which benefits will be provided to employees. As the FTT said, this is expressly contemplated by section 1290(2)(a)." (A D Bly v. HMRC [2024] UKUT 104 (TCC), Judges Thomas Scott and Greenbank)
"[36] This interpretation also has the merit that it gives to the words “unused part of his basic rate band” in s. 4(3) TCGA 1992 a meaning which is its natural meaning. Mr Furness relies on the fact that “basic rate band” is not itself a statutorily defined term, and that to find out what the whole phrase means one 20 has to look at s. 4(4), which is simply a means of introducing an arithmetical formula. It is however a general principle that where a statute uses a defined expression, be it a word or a phrase, the ordinary meaning of the defined expression is part of the material that can be used as an aid to interpretation. We were not in fact taken to any authority for this proposition but neither 25 counsel dissented from it and it is well established. As Mr Pritchard mentioned, it was endorsed by the House of Lords in Oxfordshire County Council v Oxford City Council [2006] UKHL 25 (see at [38] per Lord Hoffmann (“in construing a definition, one does not ignore the ordinary meaning of the word which Parliament has chosen to define”) and at [82] per 30 Lord Scott, approving a statement in Bennion, Statutory Interpretation that “its dictionary meaning is likely to exercise some influence over the way the definition will be understood by the court” and referring to statements in previous House of Lords cases). See also the subsequent statements of Lord Hoffmann in Birmingham City Council v Walker [2007] UKHL 22 at [11] 35 (“the ordinary meaning of the word is part of the material which can be used to construe the definition”) and Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes Ltd [2009] UKHL 38 at [17] where in relation to the analogous question of contractual interpretation he said:
“The words used as labels are seldom arbitrary. They are usually chosen as a 40 distillation of the meaning or purpose of a concept intended to be more precisely stated in the definition. In such cases the language of the defined expression may help to elucidate ambiguities in the definition or other parts of the agreement.”" (Scott v. HMRC [2018] UKUT 236 (TCC), Nugee J and Judge Aleksander)
"[67] Fourthly, there is high authority for the proposition that, if the terms of a definition are ambiguous, the choice of the term to be defined may throw some light on their meaning: see MacDonald v Dextra, loc. cit., at [18] per Lord 5 Hoffmann. Section 18 gives, in effect, a definition of “receipt” of earnings for the purposes of Chapter 4 of ITEPA. On UBS’s interpretation, Rule 2 is only a slight extension of the natural meaning of receipt embodied in Rule 1, and its rationale is easy to understand; but on HMRC’s interpretation, the accrual of an entitlement to a future payment is the very antithesis of receipt of such a 10 payment, and there is no obvious explanation why Parliament should have wished to extend the basic charge to tax on receipts to cover such a situation, particularly given the acute practical difficulties which could be expected to arise. More generally, if (for example) a person agrees to accept employment for a period of two years at a fixed salary payable monthly in arrears, nobody 15 would say that the full two years’ salary was received by the employee at the date when the contract of employment was signed, and the employer would no doubt be startled to learn that it was expected to deduct and account for tax under PAYE on the full amount at that date." (UBS AG v. HMRC [2021] UKUT 320 (TCC), Henderson J and Judge Hellier)
- Term defined made up of ordinary words with their own meaning
"[96] I also agree with the UT that in construing section 72(3) the court must give weight to the words used in the defined concept ("a self-contained part of a building") as well as the three elements in sub-paras (a) to (c) used to define it. As Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Construction (8th ed) states at [18.6], whatever definition is given to a term, the natural meaning of the term is likely to exert some influence over the way that the definition is understood and applied by the court. The term defined itself often has some potency. In this case the words "self-contained part of a building" are ordinary words with their own meaning. The phrase naturally connotes a part of a building within actual dividing features, complete in itself, rather than merely being something that could be drawn on a plan.
[97] The UT considered that the undivided space in the basement carpark was not part of "self-contained premises" in the ordinary sense. Instead, as the UT said, it is open plan and undivided. I agree with that reasoning." (The Courtyard RTM Company Ltd v. Rockwell (FC103) Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 712, Miles, Singh, Foxton LJJ)
- But not if the term has no clear or generally understood ordinary meaning
"[49] The difficulty in trying to use this sensible principle of interpretation in the present case is that it was agreed, and the Divisional Court accepted, that the phrase “claims management services” defined in section 4(2) of the 2006 Act did not have any established legal meaning. Nor, as explained below, did it have any clear or generally accepted meaning in ordinary parlance which was capable of exerting any significant “potency” in terms of qualifying the ordinary words used by Parliament in section 4(2) and (3) of the 2006 Act to define that term. Where an express definition of a term is given in statute then even if there is consensus as to its core content, in the absence of general consensus as to the limits of the term no significant potency can be attached to the term so as to colour or qualify the meaning of the definition: Phillips v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] 1 AC 1, para 20 (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, with whom the other members of the court agreed). Still less will the term defined have potency to colour the meaning of the definition if there is no general consensus as to the core meaning of the term, which is the case here. Rather, Parliament deliberately used wide words of definition in the 2006 Act precisely because of the nebulousness of the notion of “claims management services” at the time and in order to ensure that the general policy objective of Part 2 of the 2006 Act would not be undermined. That objective was to confer a general power on the Secretary of State appropriate for the regulation in the public interest of this developing area of activity, involving the creation of new commercial models to facilitate litigation and access to justice. The fact that Parliament provides a statutory definition of a term means that it is not satisfied that the term itself is sufficiently clear on its own. Where Parliament has taken the trouble to provide a definition, it is the words of the definition which are the primary guide to the meaning of the term defined. The weaker the inherent or established meaning of the term defined, the weaker must be its ability to throw light on Parliament’s meaning when setting out the express words of the definition which falls to be construed.
...
[79] Secondly, “claims management services” had no established and generally accepted meaning which could lead a reader of the text of section 4 to suppose that the express language of the definition was to be treated as qualified or coloured by that meaning. Section 4 of the 2006 Act is thus to be contrasted with those statutory contexts where the term defined does have this effect." (R (oao PACCAR Inc) v. CAT [2023] UKSC 28, Lord Sales)
- Or where there is no consensus as to the limits of the term
"[49]...Where an express definition of a term is given in statute then even if there is consensus as to its core content, in the absence of general consensus as to the limits of the term no significant potency can be attached to the term so as to colour or qualify the meaning of the definition: Phillips v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2013] 1 AC 1, para 20 (Lord Walker of Gestingthorpe, with whom the other members of the court agreed)." (R (oao PACCAR Inc) v. CAT [2023] UKSC 28, Lord Sales)
"[21] Here there is no particular potency about the expression "intellectual property" because there is a general consensus as to its core content (patents for inventions, literary, dramatic, musical and artistic copyright, copyright in recordings, films and broadcasts, registered and unregistered design rights and trademarks, all now governed by national statutes and international treaties), but no general consensus as to its limits. The sweeping-up words at the end of the definition ("or other intellectual property") no doubt include new and specialised statutory rights akin to those in the core content, such as plant breeders' rights under the Plant Varieties Act 1997 and database rights under the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 (SI 1997/3032). But for present purposes the essential point is that the definition in section 72(5) contains the words "technical or commercial information." Parliament has made plain that information within that description is, for the purposes of section 72, to be regarded as intellectual property, whether or not it would otherwise be so regarded. Such limited potency as there is in the expression "intellectual property" (and more generally, the legislative purpose of section 72 in enhancing protection against unlawful trade competition) may be of assistance in determining the meaning of "technical or commercial information". It must be something in which a civil claimant has rights capable of being infringed, since infringement of rights pertaining to intellectual property is what section 72(2)(a) is concerned with. The fact that technical and commercial information ought not, strictly speaking, to be described as property (the majority view of the House of Lords in Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46, 89-90, 103 and 127-128; cf 107 and 115) cannot prevail over the clear statutory language. Whether or not confidential information can only loosely, or metaphorically, be described as property is simply irrelevant." (Phillips v. Mulcaire [2012] UKSC 28)
Examples
- "Self-contained part of a building" has an ordinary meaning
"[96] I also agree with the UT that in construing section 72(3) the court must give weight to the words used in the defined concept ("a self-contained part of a building") as well as the three elements in sub-paras (a) to (c) used to define it. As Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Construction (8th ed) states at [18.6], whatever definition is given to a term, the natural meaning of the term is likely to exert some influence over the way that the definition is understood and applied by the court. The term defined itself often has some potency. In this case the words "self-contained part of a building" are ordinary words with their own meaning. The phrase naturally connotes a part of a building within actual dividing features, complete in itself, rather than merely being something that could be drawn on a plan.
[97] The UT considered that the undivided space in the basement carpark was not part of "self-contained premises" in the ordinary sense. Instead, as the UT said, it is open plan and undivided. I agree with that reasoning." (The Courtyard RTM Company Ltd v. Rockwell (FC103) Ltd [2026] EWCA Civ 712, Miles, Singh, Foxton LJJ)
- "Wages" has a well understood basic meaning
"[80] Delaney v Staples (trading as De Montfort Recruitment) [1992] 1 AC 687 concerned the interpretation of a statutory provision which conferred exclusive jurisdiction on industrial tribunals in respect of the lawfulness of deductions from wages, where “wages” was defined in wide terms to mean “any sums payable to the worker by his employer in connection with his employment”, with a series of items said to be included within this. The question was whether a tribunal had jurisdiction under this provision to adjudicate on the lawfulness of a failure to make a payment in lieu of notice to an employee who was summarily dismissed. The House of Lords held that since “wages” were payments in respect of the rendering of services during employment, the term did not cover payments in respect of the termination of a contract of employment. The main reasons for this conclusion were that the procedural provisions of the statute were not compatible with such an interpretation and it would have an unjustified effect on the employer’s rights of set-off under the general law. However, a failure to pay some sums after termination of the employment would be covered according to the definition, and in order to draw the necessary dividing line Lord Browne-Wilkinson, who gave the sole substantive speech, said (p 697) that “one is thrown back to the basic concept of wages as being payments in respect of the rendering of services during the employment, so as to exclude all payments in respect of the termination of the contract save to the extent that such … payments are expressly included” in the relevant statutory definition. This reasoning depended upon the concept of “wages” having a well understood basic meaning." (R (oao PACCAR Inc) v. CAT [2023] UKSC 28, Lord Sales)
"[125] HMRC go on to submit that the mere fact that the overall profits may cap the remuneration does not convert a mechanism which is broadly typical of an employee's salary plus bonus into one that is typical of a sharing of profits between partners. Even an employee's salary is ultimately dependent on the ability of the employer to pay it. In using the term "disguised salary" Parliament was intending to capture methods of remunerating LLP members which are akin to salary in an employment context, and the use of the word "salary" may legitimately colour the meaning of the term defined: see R (PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal [2023] UKSC 28, [2023] 1 WLR 2594, at [48] and (in a tax context) MacDonald v Dextra Accessories Ltd [2005] UKHL 47, [2005] 4 All ER 107, at [18] per Lord Hoffmann." (HMRC v. Bluecrest Capital management (UK) LLP [2025] EWCA Civ 23, Henderson, Lewison, Arnold LJJ)
- "Potential emolument" relevant to interpreting definition
"[18]... the ordinary use of language, the whole of the funds were potential emoluments. They could be used to pay emoluments. It is true that, as Charles J pointed out, "potential emoluments" is a defined expression and a definition may give the words a meaning different from their ordinary meaning. But that does not mean that the choice of words adopted by Parliament must be wholly ignored. If the terms of the definition are ambiguous, the choice of the term to be defined may throw some light on what they mean." (Macdonald v. Dextra Accessories Limited [2005] UKHL 47)
EXHAUSTIVE AND INCLUSIVE DEFINITIONS
"[57] In relation to the interpretation of definitions, the authorities show that:
(1) when a later enactment incorporates a definition from an earlier enactment, the definition must be assumed to bear the same meaning in the later enactment as in the earlier one, regardless of the context in which the later enactment came into being or the mischief at which the later enactment was aimed. To adopt a different approach would be "both inconsistent with the plainly expressed will of Parliament ... and a recipe for uncertainty in future cases of statutory interpretation" - see Lord Neuberger in Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10 at paragraphs [72] and [73];
(2) an exhaustive definition - typically taking the form "X means..." - provides a comprehensive description of everything covered by the defined term and displaces any meaning that the defined term would otherwise have had - see Bennion at paragraph 18.2. It is to be contrasted with an inclusive or exclusive definition, each of which modifies the natural meaning of the defined term; and
(3) that is not to say that the interpretation of a definition cannot be coloured by the defined term itself, particularly in cases of doubt. In an appropriate case, "the potency of the term defined" may provide some guidance as to the meaning of that term as set out in the statutory definition - see Bennion at paragraph 18.6. In each case, it is necessary to consider the language used in the definition and the strength or weakness of the inherent or established meaning of the term which is being defined. As Lord Sales explained in PACCAR at paragraphs [48] and [49], "[where] Parliament has taken the trouble to provide a definition, it is the words of the definition which are the primary guide to the meaning of the term defined. The weaker the inherent or established meaning of the term defined, the weaker must be its ability to throw light on Parliament's meaning when setting out the express words of the definition which falls to be construed"." (JD Wetherspoon Plc v. HMRC [2025] UKFTT 658 (TC), Judge Beare)
IMPORTING A DEFINITION
- If Parliament imports a definition, it must have the same meaning as in the earlier statute
"[50] Where a term in a later statute is defined by reference to a definition in an earlier statute, it seems to me self-evident that the meaning of the definition in the later statute must be the same as the meaning of the definition in the earlier statute. Hence, the meaning of the term in the later statute is determined by the definition in the earlier statute. Further, the adoption of the definition in the later statute cannot somehow alter the meaning of the definition in the earlier statute. It accordingly follows that one has to determine the meaning of the term in the later statute simply by construing the definition in the earlier statute. Thus, the meaning of "trustee" in section 21(1)(a) must be determined by construing the definition of "trustee" in section 68(1)(17) of the 1925 Act ("section 68(1)(17)"). In the light of Lord Mance's judgment, it is, I think, important to emphasise that the way in which the definition of "trustee" in section 68(1)(17) is incorporated into the 1980 Act appears to leave no scope for contending that the meaning of the expression in the 1980 Act can somehow be different from that which it bears in the 1925 Act." (Williams v. Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10, Lord Neuberger)
- Unintended effect in legislation importing provision no reason to construe definition otherwise than in accordance with its terms
"In conclusion on the first question I should refer to an argument of counsel for EVC that if the Crown is right on this issue then it will have the unforeseen and unwelcome consequence that the consortium relief made available by s 402 of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1988 will be withheld by s 410(2)(iii) in just those circumstances in which it is to be presumed that Parliament intended it to be available. This was not disputed by counsel for the Crown. He informed us that the Crown has had the point in mind since it first emerged in the judgment of Lightman J and will consider what to do about it if this appeal is dismissed. But he also observed, in my view rightly, that s 410 was an anti-avoidance provision which like many other such provisions sometimes covers a wider area than that strictly necessary to achieve its object. I also agree with him that that is no reason for not construing a different provision (s 839(7)) in accordance with its terms." (Steele v. EVC International NV [1996] STC 785 at 796, Morritt LJ)
- Definition deliberately not incorporated (use ordinary meaning)
"[43] We conclude that “market value” for the purpose of s. 1020 is not to be interpreted as the “open market” value as defined in s. 272 of TCGA or any other similar provisions. Had the drafter intended that to be the case then a definition to that effect would, in our view, have been included as in s. 609 and s. 210. We agree with HMRC that we cannot directly import definitions used for the purposes of other taxes, as the statutory provisions are different." (HMRC v. Pickles [2022] UKUT 253 (TCC), Bacon J and Judge Ramshaw)
- Definitions of a concept in other provisions do not assist in interpreting the concept when undefined
"But what appears to me conclusively to exclude this line of authority as determinative of the present question is that, while in general the Legislature was content to use the word "control" or "controlling interest" as interpreted by the Courts, for certain special purposes Parliament saw fit to provide a special definition of the expression "control". This necessarily implies that the special definition provided a different and special test for what, for these purposes, was to be control; and that test would be different from the ordinary meaning of control as used elsewhere in this Legislation. An illustration of such a special meaning is to be found in Paragraph 13 of the Eighth Schedule to the Finance (No. 2) Act, 1945, which was applied by Section 58 of that Act to the ascertainment of certain depreciation allowances. This special definition obviously took the meaning of control, for these special purposes, out of the ordinary definition of control to be found elsewhere in the Act. But the important point is that this special definition of control in Paragraph 13 is verbatim the same as the definition in Section 333 (1) of the Income Tax Act. 1952, which is the subject of construction in the present case. By using this special definition in the present connection, Parliament appears to me to be showing plainly that it was meant to connote something different from control as elsewhere used in these Acts and to render the interpretation of that word as used elsewhere no real guidance in the present connection. In these circumstances I do not find it necessary to review this line of authority in detail, nor to examine the soundness of the various distinctions drawn in the course of the argument between the facts in these cases and in the present case." (CIR v. Lithgows Ltd (1960) 39 TC 270 at 275 (Court of Session))
- Meaning of trade does not vary depending on context
"[Counsel for the taxpayer] argued that the provisions of s.592(3) must be construed in such a way as to provide a generous measure of relief for pension schemes, since it cannot have been Parliament's intention to afford relief only to schemes which undertook very occasional sub-underwriting, and to deprive very large pension schemes of any relief.
The judge was right to view this submission with disfavour. It is unprofitable to speculate as to what view Parliament took, when this provision was first introduced by the Finance Act 1971, as to how the Case I / Case VI dividing line would work in practice, whether for small, medium-sized or large pension schemes. Even if the answer to that question could be known, it could hardly justify, on grounds of an allegedly purposive construction, the attribution of a special meaning to the expression `trade' (which does not appear in s.592(3)). In Craven v White [1989] AC 398, 442 Parker LJ observed,
"In this limited sense the purpose does not appear to be of any assistance in the present appeals for the detailed and elaborate provisions of the Finance Act 1965 make it clear that the purpose was to tax some people and not others in respect of certain transactions and not others, and one can only determine which people and which transactions by looking at the words of the sections."
The provisions of s.592(3) are not detailed or elaborate, but the case-law on Case I of Schedule D is extensive, and it is that, rather than any supposedly purposive construction of s.592(3), which must be the guide." (Trustees of BT Pension Schemes v. Clark [2000] EWCA Civ 55, Robert Walker LJ)
DISAPPLYING A DEFINITION
"Context otherwise requires" or "contrary intention" proviso
- Context must compel a different interpretation
"[32] A right to dispose of valuable assets as one thinks fit is plainly a valuable right. Given the Revenue's acceptance that, apart from the question whether the context otherwise requires, "property" is capable of including a general power of appointment, the real question in the case is whether the context otherwise requires. The industry of Mr. Furness brought to light two cases on the 1925 property legislation on the meaning of the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires". In Gaul and Houston's Contract [1928] Ch. 689 Lawrence L.J. at p. 700 indicated that where effect can be given to words, if interpreted in accordance with the statutory interpretation provision, sensibly and properly, the context cannot be said to require otherwise. In Re Cowley Settled Estates [1926] Ch. 725 at p. 736 Astbury J. held that in order to justify departing from the statutory definition, there must be a "necessary context or requirement". In my judgment those authorities confirm the correctness of the judge's approach that the statutory interpretation has to be adopted unless the context compels the adoption of another interpretation." (Melville v. IRC [2001] EWCA Civ 1247)
- Allows partial adjustment of definition
[75] However, here a statute imports a complex, many-limbed definition from another statute and provides that the definition applies in a number of different places in the importing statute. We do not see that it makes sense to treat the qualifying words that Parliament has included in s 288 as requiring a choice between applying every element in the definition or none...
...
[77] Newfields therefore recognises that where a definition has been drafted for one purpose but is imported into another context for a different purpose one must take care in applying it in that other context not to include unsuitable elements that arrive at results which are illogical or which require one to take into account an irrelevant consideration. Again, we recognise that this case is not on all fours with Newfields because there is no doubt that the associate attribution rule is part of the definition of 'control' and not some additional wording which is intended only to apply in the original context of defining close companies. But it would not be possible to follow Lord Hoffmann's guidance if one were faced with the choice of either applying s 416 in its unmodified entirety or disapplying it." (Reeves v. HMRC [2018] UKUT 293 (TCC), Rose J and Judge Sinfield)
- IA 1978 definition of land only applicable to rule, not exception (avoiding concept of buildings being built on buildings)
"“Trading stock” is defined...
(2) Sub-paragraph (1) above does not apply to —...
(b) land, other than such as is ordinarily sold in the course of the trade... —
(i) after being developed by the person carrying on the trade, profession or vocation,
...
(3) In sub-paragraph (2) above, references to development are references to the construction or substantial reconstruction of buildings on the land in question...
...
[-] It is clear that the proper construction of sub-paragraph (2)(b ) would present no difficulty if it were not for the presence of sub-paragraph (3). Applying the Interpretation Act meaning of “land” to that word in sub-paragraph (2)(b ) would have the result of demonstrating that no land, in that wide sense, was intended to have the benefit of stock relief unless it was such as was not ordinarily sold in the course of the trade by the person carrying on the trade except after development by that person. That would evince an entirely reasonable and intelligible policy. The fact that land can embrace various species of property which by their nature are not capable of being developed would not present any problem. It would only be such species as were capable of being developed that would fall into the privileged class, if they were not ordinarily sold in an undeveloped state.
[-] The purpose of sub-paragraph (3) is to define the meaning of references to development in sub-paragraph (2), and it prescribes a more limited meaning than would, in a planning context, be applicable to such references. Here again, the definition can only have relevance in connection with such species of land as are capable of being developed. Having regard to what is the clear purpose of sub-paragraph (3), it cannot, in my opinion, be relied on so as to attribute to “land” in sub-paragraph (2)(b ) a special limited meaning, excluding the application of the Interpretation Act.
[-] If it had been the intention of the draftsman to limit the meaning to land which is unbuilt on, one would have expected him to say so expressly.
[-] Further, it seems to me that the references to “reconstruction of buildings on the land in question” recognises that some land which is within the ambit of sub-paragraph (2) may be land with buildings on it. Obviously the land and the buildings on it form one hereditament. The Interpretation Act does not require an artificial separation between land and a building erected on it, contrary to the maxim quidquid solo plantatur solo accedit.
[-] For these reasons I am of opinion that there is nothing in the context to exclude the application of the Interpretation Act definition to the word “land” in sub-paragraph (2)(b ), whereas the context of sub-paragraph (3) necessarily requires its limitation there to such land as is capable of being developed by the construction or reconstruction of buildings on it. The rule that the same word occurring more than once in an enactment should be given the same meaning wherever it occurs is a guide which must yield to indications of contrary intention, and such an intention must necessarily be inferred here. A further consideration in favour of that view is that the contrary one would require a separation of the site of a building from the building itself with relief being available in respect of the latter but not in respect of the former. This would involve an apportionment of value, for which no machinery is provided." (Payne v. Barratt Developments (Luton) Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 1 (HoL) - T argued that the context indicated that land meant only bare land because otherwise the proviso would be referring to buildings being constructed on buildings. HoL disapplied the definition that land includes buildings but only in relation to the proviso, not the main exception)
- Buildings excluded from "land" because they were dealt with by separate limb of IHT agricultural property relief
"The first matter relied on by the judge was that as pasture was undoubtedly bare uncultivated land and was a part of a composite expression the agricultural land referred to must also be bare land. I do not accept this. It is common in some parts of the country for pasture to include buildings for the storage of winter feed or to provide shelter for the animals using the pasture. Further, the 1978 Act requires the word 'land' to be read as including 'buildings or other structures' unless the contrary intention appears. Thus neither by itself nor in conjunction with the word pasture can the words 'agricultural land' be read as bare land.
Thus the intention that 'buildings and other structures' should not be read into the word 'land' must appear, if at all, from other parts of the definition or the Act. In that connection I do not find part 2 to be of assistance. It was required so that woodland might be included and to resolve doubts which might be entertained as to the status of buildings used for intensive farming whether of livestock or fish.
But part 3 is in my view important for it refers expressly to the buildings and structures which would be most obviously included in the words 'agricultural land' if the 1978 Act applied in full. Counsel for the executors sought to escape from the consequence by submitting that part 3 was necessary to pick up those buildings which because they were not occupied for agricultural purposes did not come within part 1 but which because of their character were appropriate to be treated as agricultural land. The problem with this submission is that it would include in the definition of agricultural property that which could never qualify for the relief allowed to property of that type because it could never come within s 117 for which occupation for the purposes of agriculture for two or seven years is essential. It is true as counsel for the executors submitted that s 117 is not part of the definition and that tax legislation is not always wholly consistent. Nevertheless this seems to me to be an indication contrary to the inclusion of the relevant words said to be derived from the 1978 Act." (Starke v. IRC [1996] 1 All ER 622 at 628 (CoA))
Implicit disapplication
- Expansive definition made sense for permissive provision but produced absurd results for restrictive provision
"[73] As explained in Stephen White, "Cremation Act 1902 s. 5 (the 'distance' or 'radius' clause): The Balloon and String Theory of Statutory Interpretation" (2013) 78 Pharos International 4, which is extensively referenced in the Consultation Paper, these clauses were apparently added because "the Local Government Board wanted to ensure that a burial authority would be empowered not just to build (and be able to borrow money to build) the structure housing the cremator, but everything else that a burial authority might provide in connection with cemeteries, such as chapels and mortuaries."
[74] The extended wording therefore makes good sense in the context of the permissive purposes of section 4. It, however, makes little or no sense in the context of the restrictive purposes of section 5.
If the extended wording is given its naturally wide meaning, as explained above, it would include access roads. This, however, results in an absurdity and renders the Act unworkable. It would mean that a burial authority would never be able to connect its proposed crematorium site to a highway because any access road has to be 50 yards from the public highway. The consequence would be that a crematorium could only be built in cemeteries or burial grounds which already had the necessary access roads. That would completely undermine the Act's purpose of facilitating the establishment of crematoria." (Wathen-Fayed v. SoS [2025] UKSC 32)
- Only core part of definition applied (not expanding words) to avoid absurdity
"[78] The presumption against absurdity therefore strongly suggests that the extended definition of crematorium cannot apply to section 5. There are other indications to the same effect. If there is no justification for limiting the extended wording to the process of burning human remains and to dealings with ashes, then it applies to all incidental and ancillary uses of the site. It is, however, impossible to see what rationale there could be for applying distance restrictions to all such uses. Why, as the judge pointed out, should there be a distance requirement from landscaping or an ornamental garden? The same applies to many other uses, such as a chapel, waiting area, ceremony hall, access road, car park or service yard. This is even more so when one considers that the distance requirement applies not just to a dwelling house but also to a public highway. An example given in oral argument is of a gate lodge building, which is a common feature of many cemeteries. If this is part of a crematorium, then no such building could be located within 50 yards of the gate. It makes no sense to impose such a distance restriction.
[79] A solution to the difficulty and indeed absurdity of applying the extended definition of crematorium to section 5 is to hold that, for the purposes of that section, only the core definition applies. In other words, in section 5 "crematorium" means a "building fitted with appliances for the purpose of burning human remains" (ie the crematory building). This is supported by other provisions in section 5." (Wathen-Fayed v. SoS [2025] UKSC 32)