Interpreting legislation to deal with modern developments

- Reference to booklet to include e-tickets

"[103] The parties agree that legislation which has not kept pace with technological change must be construed in accordance with “always speaking” principles—that is, it is necessary to ascertain what it is that Parliament intended and apply the words used, in a manner which respects that intention, to (in this case) a technique for documenting the right to take a flight not contemplated by Parliament in 1994, albeit, as s 43(1) shows, a “document” and, correspondingly, a “ticket” need not consist of paper.

[104] The move from paper to electronic tickets is only one example of such an unforeseen change; another is the scientific advance in human genetics which was the subject-matter of R (Quintavalle) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 AC 687...

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[133] We are satisfied that the CFO imposes two discrete conditions which must be met if the exemption is to apply. The purpose of the second, the ticketing condition, is to prescribe the method by which it is to be demonstrated that the two (or more) flights said to be connected make up a single journey. Accordingly we answer the first of the questions transferred to us from the First-tier Tribunal as follows:

Properly construed, the relevant legislative provisions stipulate that two flights are connected for the purposes of the application of the connected flights exemption only if (a) the interval between the flights satisfies the relevant temporal condition and (b) the customer has, or can readily access, a ticket or tickets, or their electronic equivalents, which provide all of the prescribed particulars of each flight sufficient to show, by their referring to each other or by means of a shared PNR or in a similar manner, that together they constitute a single journey." (Ryanair Limited v. HMRC [2013] UKUT 176 (TCC), Warren J and Judge Bishopp)

- Limits

"[39] I take the view that one can apply the "always speaking" approach to statutory construction to the provisions of the Schedule to the CFO, although we are not called upon on this appeal to express any view as to whether, so interpreted, they were satisfied by airlines other than Ryanair in the period under review. But I am also satisfied that, whether or not they can be so interpreted, the correct approach to construction is not to delete Notes (5)(b) and (6) from the Schedule. Lord Pannick's point that some support for Ryanair's construction can be derived from the present impossibility of literal compliance with the conjunction tickets provisions is, I think, misplaced. The CFO cannot be construed by reference to subsequent events which were not necessarily foreseeable in 1994 and, when looked at in the context of the ticketing practices at that time, its provisions were entirely workable." (Ryanair Limited v. HMRC [2014] EWCA Civ 410)

- Not applied to a technical term defined by statute (rather than ordinary words)

"[104] On the basis that “registered medical practitioner” is a technical term defined by statute, we also agree that there is no room to apply the “always speaking” principle which applies to situations where the law has not kept up with the development in meaning of ordinary words.

[105] For these reasons we conclude that, applying normal UK principles of statutory construction, Dr El-Khourabi was not an “appropriate practitioner” within the meaning of Note 2B so that medical supplies dispensed on his perfectly lawful prescriptions were not entitled to be zero-rated." (Pearl Chemist Limited v. HMRC [2019] UKFTT 264 (TC), Judge McKeever)